Senators: FEMA's Proposed Disaster Recovery Plan Insufficient
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s proposed national
disaster recovery plan still has significant gaps, four leading
senators have told Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairman Joe
Lieberman, ID-Conn., and Ranking Member Susan Collins, R-Me., along
with Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery Chairman Mary Landrieu, D-La.,
and Ranking Member Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., have submitted formal
comments to the Secretary on the draft National Disaster Recovery
Framework in a letter copied below.
The Disaster Recovery Framework's purpose is to provide guidance on
how community recovery is supported at the national level. The
Administration has stated that the Framework is intended to fulfill the
National Disaster Recovery Strategy required by a provision in the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, authored by Senators
Lieberman and Collins.
A copy of the letter follows:
February 26, 2010
The Honorable Janet Napolitano
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528
Dear Secretary Napolitano:
As the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (the Committee) and as the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster
Recovery, we are writing to provide comments on the draft National
Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). We ask that our letter be treated
as a response to the request for comments in FEMA Docket ID
FEMA-2010-0004 (75 Fed. Reg. 6681 (February 10, 2010)) and included as
part of the public record in that matter. While we enthusiastically
support the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to provide both strategic and operational guidance to recovery
partners, we would like to raise some concerns about the draft NDRF and
ask that you address our comments in the final NDRF.
In investigating the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, the
Committee found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
especially FEMA, was unprepared for a catastrophic event. In response
to the Committee's investigation and subsequent recommendations,
Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of
2006 (the Act), which President Bush signed into law in October 2006.
The Act created a new FEMA - with responsibilities, missions,
capabilities, and resources far exceeding those of FEMA at the time of
Hurricane Katrina - by vesting greater autonomy and elevating the
status of FEMA and its leaders within the Department. In addition, the
Act gave FEMA and its Administrator elevated and expanded roles in
leading the nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond
to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of disasters.
Section 682 of the Act dealt specifically with FEMA's role in disaster
recovery by requiring FEMA, within 270 days of the Act's
implementation, to develop a National Disaster Recovery Strategy. We
have long been disappointed by FEMA's failure to meet this requirement
given our great need to improve our nation's ability to recover from
disasters. Administrator Fugate informed us in a September 16, 2009
letter that FEMA was launching the development of the National Disaster
Recovery Framework, which would address all of section 682's
requirements.
The need for this framework is even more clearly illustrated given that
the recovery from Hurricane Katrina has been a long, hard struggle. We
believe that a well-developed recovery plan is necessary to ensure
that, in the future, communities will be able to better recover from
disasters. We would like to congratulate DHS for undertaking this
serious endeavor. We understand that this draft framework was produced
in a short amount of time and with the engagement of stakeholders.
We are pleased that the draft addresses a wide range of entities
involved in recovery, from governments and nonprofits, to the private
sector and individuals. As the document recognizes, each of these
groups must be ready and equipped to perform their critical roles. We
are also glad to see that recovery preparedness was discussed in the
draft NDRF. We believe that current preparedness efforts of the federal
government, as well as many state, local, and tribal governments, fail
to focus adequately on recovery issues or otherwise fall short of what
is necessary.
While we applaud your efforts to attempt to write a recovery plan, we
believe that the draft Framework falls short of meeting section 682's
requirements and have several concerns with the content of the draft.
Ambiguity in leadership, roles, authorities, and responsibilities:
Section 682 of the Post-Katrina Act requires that the recovery strategy
clearly define the roles, authorities, and responsibilities of each
federal agency that may provide assistance in the recovery from major
disasters. However, in the chapters on roles and responsibilities and
planning for a successful recovery in the NDRF, the draft simply gives
roles and responsibilities to the "federal government" instead of
specifically stating which federal agency or federal official has such
roles and responsibilities.
One of the key issues in the failed response to Hurricane Katrina was
the lack of clearly understood leadership roles and responsibilities.
Effective planning requires clearly identified roles and
responsibilities, yet the draft NDRF fails to identify who within the
federal government will play a leadership role and fails to adequately
clarify roles and responsibilities of individual departments, agencies,
and officials. While it is essential that all federal agencies with
potentially applicable resources and programs assist with recovery in a
much more active manner than has generally occurred in previous
disasters, without more specificity as to who is in charge of federal
efforts and what specific roles and responsibilities individual
agencies have, it is unlikely that the framework will operate
effectively. In addition, it will be very difficult for state, local,
and tribal governments to know who within the federal government to
turn to regarding particular recovery issues. The NDRF also must
clearly state the responsibilities of state and local governments.
One specific example of the failure to articulate federal roles and
responsibilities is the absence of a reference to either FEMA or its
Administrator, except to refer families to FEMA as a source for helping
them get prepared, in the chapters on roles and responsibilities,
recovery coordinators, and planning for a successful disaster recovery.
The NDRF simply refers broadly to the "federal government" instead of
explicitly stating the roles and responsibilities of FEMA and the FEMA
Administrator. The Act gave FEMA and its Administrator elevated and
expanded roles, including in recovery, and the draft fails to implement
this statutory role.
Additionally, the draft NDRF provides checklists of items that federal,
state, and local government responsibilities "may include." We believe
that this language is too deferential and should instead more
affirmatively state what the responsibilities of federal, state, and
local governments include.
Recovery Support Functions: The draft NDRF also includes a chapter of
six Recovery Support Functions (RSFs) that the draft says are designed
to bring together federal departments and agencies to collaborate and
focus on recovery needs. The draft states that the RSFs are meant to
co-exist and complement the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) under
the NRF.
As drafted, however, the RSFs are lacking in the level of detail
necessary to be operationally effective, including failing to clearly
state roles and responsibilities. The RSFs generally include only a
short paragraph describing the mission and outcome of the RSF. In
addition, some RSFs are unfinished because the proposed coordinating
agency has not been named. In contrast, the ESFs in the NRF are on
average 10-15 pages and include sections such as an introduction,
concept of operations, organization, pre- and post- event actions, and
a description of responsibilities for each of the agencies involved in
the ESF. The draft is also not clear at what stage the RSFs will be
activated; for example the draft does not explain at what stage HUD
would take the lead in housing. While we note that the draft NDRF
states that each RSF will develop more detailed supporting guidance and
tools for members, the draft fails to provide sufficient information as
to what additional guidance will be produced and when it will be
available. This detail should be included in the RSFs in the final NDRF.
Additionally, the draft is not clear as to who is charged with the
overall leadership of the six RSFs. Although the draft states that RSF
coordinators will lead each RSF, it does not state who will provide
overall federal leadership over the RSFs to ensure that the actions of
the individual RSFs are coordinated and effective.
The draft also says that each RSF coordinator has ongoing
responsibilities throughout the preparedness, response, and recovery
phases to ensure ongoing communication and coordination between primary
and support agencies and to coordinate efforts with corresponding
tribal, state, NGO, and private-sector organizations, but the draft
does not make clear what those preparedness responsibilities are and
how they will be carried out.
We are also concerned that the draft NDRF does not articulate the role
of FEMA in the RSFs. Although FEMA is currently the coordinator for
ESF-14, Long-Term Community Recovery, the draft NDRF does not name FEMA
as a coordinating agency for any of the RSFs.
Additionally, we believe it would be useful to consider inclusion of
more federal agencies on some of the RSFs in order to more effectively
use potential resources. For example, some additional agencies to
consider including are the Department of Transportation and the
Environmental Protection Agency in the Community Planning and Capacity
Building RSF and the Department of Energy in the Natural and Cultural
Resources RSF.
Finally, ESF-14 currently addresses Long-Term Community Recovery, but
the draft NDRF does not explain what will happen to ESF-14 once the
NDRF is finalized and in effect, and it should.
Federal Recovery Coordinator: The draft NDRF describes responsibilities
of the Federal Recovery Coordinator (FRC) as an official who will, when
activated, facilitate federal assistance, coordination and
collaboration with state, local, and tribal governments, the private
sector, and voluntary faith-based and community organizations. As
documented by our Committee's review of the response to Hurricane
Katrina, confusion about the roles of the Federal Coordinating Officer
and Principal Federal Official contributed greatly to the failed
response at all levels of government. The Government Accountability
Office has also documented confusion regarding the role and authorities
of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding. Because we must
ensure confusion about the roles of federal officials does not cause
problems in future disasters, the section of the draft NDRF on the FRC,
which is incomplete and ambiguous, must provide more clarity on the
FRC. Just a few of the details that are ambiguous include: (1) when an
FRC will be appointed and who appoints the FRC; (2) under what
authority the FRC would operate; (3) what qualifications would be
required of FRCs; and (4) what the chain of command would be for the
FRCs in relation to other federal response and recovery officials.
Federal Programs: Section 682 also requires that the Recovery Strategy
describe in detail the programs of each federal agency that may provide
assistance in the recovery from major disasters and outline the most
efficient and cost-effective federal programs that will meet recovery
needs. Although the draft NDRF refers to disasterassistance.gov, a
website through which individuals can apply for federal disaster
assistance programs, the draft itself does not describe the programs
that may provide assistance. While the tool at disasterassistance.gov
is potentially useful to individuals seeking disaster assistance, it
does not seem to explain federal programs for which state, local, and
tribal governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations, may be
eligible. Additionally, the draft NDRF fails to meet the Act's
requirement to outline the most efficient and cost-effective federal
programs that will meet recovery needs. Finally, the draft NDRF fails
to meet the Act's requirement to describe in detail any funding issues
in the federal programs that may be offered.
Scalability to a catastrophe: As the recovery from Hurricane Katrina
has shown and still continues to show us, recovery from a catastrophe
is extremely complicated and presents far more challenges than smaller
disasters. Although the draft NDRF states that it is designed to be
scalable and adaptable to specific disaster requirements, we do not see
many aspects of the draft NDRF that specifically address scalability.
Indeed, the draft NDRF does not describe any special provisions that
would be in place in recovery from catastrophes. We believe the draft
needs to more clearly address the special issues that arise in recovery
from catastrophes.
Mitigation: Mitigation has proven to be a cost-effective way of
reducing loss of life, personal injuries, damage and destruction of
property, and disruption of communities and economies from disasters
and is one of the most fundamental long-term contributions that can be
made to the safe recovery of a community. Recent studies have found
taxpayer savings between three to four dollars for every dollar spent
on mitigation. Recovery and rebuilding after disasters offers a
critical opportunity for mitigation against potential damages caused by
future disasters. We believe that the draft NDRF puts too little
emphasis on mitigation and fails to put in place plans and procedures
to make the most of these critical mitigation opportunities. We believe
more needs to be added to the final NDRF to ensure we maximize
mitigation opportunities both before and after disasters.
Private Sector Preparedness: We are pleased that the draft NDRF
discusses the role of the private sector because it is an essential
player in the recovery process. We believe, however, that the final
NDRF should promote PS-Prep, the voluntary private sector preparedness
certification program, established by section 901 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. This important
program can play a vital role in helping the private sector recover
from disasters. We believe the NDRF offers an excellent opportunity to
encourage the private sector to voluntarily get prepared through the
PS-Prep program.
Difficulties in operationalizing the NDRF: While page five of the draft
NDRF states that the NDRF "provides operational guidance to all
recovery partners," we disagree. Given the lack of clarity, noted
above, in describing responsibilities, capabilities, policies or
resources, we have concerns that the framework lacks sufficient detail
to make it operationally effective in the recovery from a disaster.
The draft NDRF mentions that supporting guidance and tools will follow
the NDRF's publication, but it is unclear if this will be before or
after the NDRF is to be used in disasters. The draft also suggests that
there is no current intention to make additional changes to the
document and that the framework will only be revised as necessary when
responsibilities, capabilities, policies, and resources expand or
change (page 6). This statement concerns us since we do not believe
that the current draft NDRF adequately describes responsibilities,
capabilities, policies, or resources.
Finally, as is axiomatic among those who respond to disasters, to be
successful, plans must be reinforced with training and exercises. We
believe the draft NDRF fails to adequately emphasize the importance of
training and exercises and that it should be changed to address these
activities directly and specifically.
We look forward to working with you to improve and finalize the NDRF.